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ABSTRACT
With the globalization of manufacturing and supply chains, ensur-
ing the security and trustworthiness of ICs has become an urgent
challenge. Split manufacturing (SM) and layout camouflaging (LC)
are promising techniques to protect the intellectual property (IP)
of ICs from malicious entities during and after manufacturing (i.e.,
from untrusted foundries and reverse-engineering by end-users). In
this paper, we strive for “the best of both worlds,” that is of SM and
LC. To do so, we extend both techniques towards 3D integration,
an up-and-coming design and manufacturing paradigm based on
stacking and interconnecting of multiple chips/dies/tiers.
Initially, we review prior art and their limitations. We also put
forward a novel, practical threat model of IP piracy which is in line
with the business models of present-day design houses. Next, we
discuss how 3D integration is a naturally strong match to combine
SM and LC. We propose a security-driven CAD and manufactur-
ing flow for face-to-face (F2F) 3D ICs, along with obfuscation of
interconnects. Based on this CAD flow, we conduct comprehensive
experiments on DRC-clean layouts. Strengthened by an extensive
security analysis (also based on a novel attack to recover obfus-
cated F2F interconnects), we argue that entering the next, third
dimension is eminent for effective and efficient IP protection.
1 INTRODUCTION
On the one hand, design practices by the industry attach impor-
tance to optimize for power, performance, and area (PPA) at the
level of physical design or design architecture (e.g., cache hierar-
chies, speculative execution). On the other hand, researchers have
demonstrated powerful attacks (e.g., Spectre [1] or side-channel
leakage [2]) which leverage these very practices and optimization
steps. Apart from such concerns regarding the security and trust-
worthiness of hardware at runtime, protecting the hardware itself
from threats such as intellectual property (IP) piracy, illegal overpro-
duction or insertion of hardware Trojans is another challenge [3].
Various design and manufacturing schemes have been put forth
over the last decade, e.g., ranging from logic locking [4, 5], layout
camouflaging [6–13], to split manufacturing [14–20]. The common
theme among these techniques is that they incorporate security as
a critical design parameter besides the traditional PPA metrics.
Independent of hardware security, 3D integration has made sig-
nificant progress over recent years. 3D integration is to stack and
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Figure 1: Our security-driven scheme for 3D integration,
focused on face-to-face (F2F) 3D ICs. Through-silicon vias
(TSVs) are for external connections, and redistribution lay-
ers (RDLs) for internal connections. We advance split manu-
facturing for untrusted FEOL fabrication along with trusted
camouflaging of RDLs—both techniques are a naturalmatch
for taking IP protection to the next, third dimension.
interconnect multiple chips/dies/tiers, thereby promising to over-
come the scalability bottleneck (“More-Moore”), which is further
exacerbated by challenges for pitch scaling, routing congestion,
process variations, et cetera [21, 22]. Recent studies and prototypes
show that 3D integration can indeed offer significant benefits over
conventional 2D chips [23–25]. Besides, 3D integration advances
manufacturing capabilities by various means such as parallel han-
dling of wafers, higher yields due to smaller outlines of individual
chips, and heterogeneous integration (“More-than-Moore”) [26].
In this paper, we propose and evaluate a security-driven CAD
flow for 3D ICs. We argue that 3D integration is an excellent can-
didate for IP protection, and we demonstrate that by combining
layout camouflaging (LC) and split manufacturing (SM) naturally
into one scheme (Fig. 1). This paper can be summarized as follows:
• Initially, we review state-of-the-art approaches for LC and
SM. We compare and contrast these schemes with regards to
their security guarantees, shortcomings, and impact on PPA.
• Next, we put forward a practical threat model which is in
line with the present-day business models of design houses.
This model necessitates both LC and SM in conjunction.
• Most importantly, we demonstrate how 3D integration can
help to achieve the “best of both worlds,” by combining the
features of LC and SM. Thus, our scheme allows to inherently
protect against IP piracy conducted by malicious entities
during fabrication (untrusted foundries) and after fabrication
(untrusted end-users). The key idea is to “3D split” the design
into two tiers and to obfuscate the interconnects between
those tiers. Towards this end, we propose a security-driven
CAD and manufacturing flow for face-to-face (F2F) 3D ICs.
• We implement our CAD flow using Cadence Innovus. We
conduct a thorough analysis of DRC-clean layouts tailored
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for F2F 3D integration, and we contrast with the prior art of
LC or SM (targeting on 2D/3D ICs) wherever applicable.
• We present an extensive security analysis, underpinned by
a novel proximity-centric attack on our security-driven 3D
integration scheme.We provide both analytical and empirical
data to showcase the resilience of our proposed schemes.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Layout Camouflaging
Camouflaging (LC) is a layout-level technique to foil an adversary’s
efforts for correctly inferring the design functionality while reverse
engineering some chip. LC is accomplished during manufacturing
by (i) dissolving optically distinguishable traits of standard cells,
e.g., using look-alike gates [6] or secretly configured MUXes [7],
(ii) using selective doping implantation for threshold-voltage-based
obfuscation [8–10], or (iii) rendering the BEOL wires and/or vias
resilient against reverse engineering [11, 12].
Existing schemes can incur significant PPA overheads once LC
is applied for large parts of the design. For example for [6], cam-
ouflaging 50% of the design results in ≈150% overheads for power
and area, respectively (Fig. 2). Other emerging schemes such as
threshold-voltage-based LC can suffer from massive PPA overheads
as well; see Sec. 6 for more comparative results. Also note that most
schemes require alterations to the FEOL manufacturing process,
which can be costly. There, since camouflaging builds the secret for
IP protection, the commissioned FEOL fab has to be trusted.
2.2 Split Manufacturing
Split manufacturing (SM) offers an interesting solution to safe-
guard the design IP duringmanufacturing time. Most commonly SM
means that the device layer and few lower metal layers (front-end-
of-line, FEOL) are fabricated using a high-end, potentially untrusted
foundry, whereas the remaining interconnects (back-end-of-line,
BEOL) are grown on top of the FEOL wafer by a trusted facility. The
security promise lies in the fact that the untrusted foundry only
holds a part of the overall design, making it difficult to infer the
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Figure 2: PPA cost in % for look-alike camouflaging [6]
(left) and explicit lifting of randomly selected wires to M8
(right). Results are averaged across ITC-99 benchmarks. For
LC (left), the impact on power and area is substantial, given
that the NAND-NOR-XOR structure in [14] incurs 4× and
5.5× more area and power compared to a regular 2-input
NAND gate. For SM (right), the cost for area is severe; that is
because routing resources are relatively scarce for M8 (pitch
= 0.84µm), and lifting of wires occupies further resources,
which can only be obtained by enlarging the chip outlines.
complete design functionality, and thereby hindering an adversary
from IP piracy or targeted insertion of hardware Trojans.
Existing CAD tools, however, due to their focus on design closure
(and their so-far agnostic view on security), tend to leave hints for an
FEOL-based adversary. To honor PPA, for example, to-be-connected
cells are typically placed close to each other. Hence, Rajendran et
al. [14] proposed a so-called proximity attack which models this
principle to infer the missing BEOL connections.
Various placement-centric [17, 18, 20] and/or routing-centric [15–
17] schemes have been proposed recently, which all aim to counter
the efforts of various iterations of proximity attacks [18, 19]. Among
those defense schemes, lifting of wires above the split layer is an
intuitive way to obfuscate the IP. That is, the revealing or critical
wires (as selected by the designer) are lifted, e.g., with the help of
routing pins in higher layers. In our exploratory experiments on
randomized lifting of nets (Fig. 2), we observe steady increases in
PPA cost. As with LC, more comparative results are given in Sec. 6.
2.3 3D Integration and CAD Flows
3D integration can be classified into four flavors: (1) through-silicon
via (TSV)-based 3D ICs, where chips are fabricated separately and
then stacked, with inter-chip connections being realized by TSVs
connected to metal layers; (2) face-to-face (F2F) stacking, where
two tiers are fabricated separately and then bonded together at
their metal faces; (3) monolithic 3D ICs, where multiple tiers are
manufactured sequentially, with inter-tier connects based on reg-
ular metal vias; (4) 2.5D integration, where chips are fabricated
separately and then bonded to a system-level interconnect carrier,
the interposer. Each option has its scope, benefits and drawbacks,
and requirements for CAD and manufacturing processes [21, 27].
F2F stacking has arguably emerged as most promising (along
with monolithic 3D ICs); various studies are actively streamlining
efforts for commercial adoption [23, 28–30]. The principal goal of
these studies is to optimize for PPA and the microarchitecture, not
hardware security. More specifically, prior CAD flows carefully
trade off intra-tier wiring with vertical interconnects across tiers.
While the latter is the key feature of 3D integration, an overly large
number of crossings/cuts has a significant impact on PPA as well. As
we will explain in Sec. 6.3 in more detail, however, a large number
of cuts is mandatory for a strong resilience against IP piracy.
3 A PRACTICAL THREAT MODEL
Here we put forward a novel, practical threat model for IP piracy,
which is in line with the business models of present-day design
houses. Consider the following scenario. A design house commis-
sions an untrustworthy foundry to manufacture their newest ver-
sion of some chip. This new version is typically extended from
previous versions of the chip (Fig. 3)—the reuse of IP modules and
the re-purposing of proven architectures are well-known principles.
Hence, the previous versions of the chip can be obtained from the
market. For example, think of the flagship iPhone® by Apple®. The
iPhone 7, based on the A10 chip, was launched in September 2016,
and the iPhone X, based on the successor chip A11, was launched
in September 2017—both chips are available in the market. In this
scenario, it is intuitive that recovering the new IP can become sig-
nificantly less challenging for the potentially untrustworthy fab.
In case the same fab was already commissioned for the previous
version, it readily holds that prior layout; otherwise it can reverse
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Figure 3: (a) Current chip version (top) versus new chip ver-
sion (bottom). In the new version, the IP modules E and F
are entirely new, while the othermodules are revised and/or
reshaped. (b) Foundry scenarios for our security-driven 3D
integration scheme. For both tiers manufactured by an un-
trusted foundry (right), IP modules can be split up.
engineer the layout from chips bought in the market. In any case,
the adversaries can compare that prior layout with the new layout,
to locate and focus on those parts which are different and unique.
Now, the conclusion for this thought experiment is that both SM
and LC are required for manufacturing of all different chip versions.
LC is required to prevent reverse engineering of the current lay-
out by any other fab commissioned for later chip versions; SM is
necessary to prevent the fab which is manufacturing the current
version (and which is also tasked to implement LC) from readily
inferring the complete layout of the current version. Prior art can
only account for this practical threat model by applying both SM
and LC, which can exacerbate the overheads and shortcomings as
discussed in Sec. 2. Next, we outline our scheme to combine SM
and LC naturally while leveraging 3D integration.
4 3D INTEGRATION: OUR CONCEPT FOR IP
PROTECTION IN THE NEXT DIMENSION
The primary advancement we propose for SM is to “3D split” the
design into multiple tiers. That is, unlike regular SM in 2D where
the whole layout is split into FEOL and BEOL, here we split the
layout itself into two parts. These two parts are manufactured as
separate chips and then stacked and interconnected, in this paper
based on the F2F flow. Our work is the first which demonstrates
such a natural extension of SM.1 We suggest that 3D SM can be
done either by different foundries or by one foundry (Fig. 3):
(1) Different trusted and untrusted foundries: Here we delegate
the manufacturing to one low-end but trusted and one high-
end but untrusted foundry, both with FEOL/BEOL capabili-
ties. A chip company may have significantly more options
to commission a trustworthy foundry (or even manufacture
in-house) in case the sought-after technology node is old
yet still widely available, e.g., 180nm. While keeping one
design part exclusively with a trusted foundry is promising
security-wise, the practicality of this option seems limited.
(2) Untrusted foundries/foundry: Here we commission only high-
end but untrusted foundries for both parts/chips. This way,
we may benefit from the latest technology node but, natu-
rally, have to split the design in such a way that the foundries
1We acknowledge that the idea for 3D SM was envisioned in 2008 by Tezzaron [31].
Also, there are studies hinting at the benefits of 3D integration for SM [32–36], but
all have shortcomings or cover different scenarios: Dofe et al. [32] and Gu et al. [33]
remain on the conceptional level; Xie et al. [35] and Imeson et al. [34] consider 2.5D
integration where only wires are hidden from the untrusted foundry; Valamehr et
al. [36] propose to stack customized monitoring circuitry on top of untrustworthy
chips, i.e., they leverage 3D integration for runtime monitoring, not for IP protection.
Table 1: Timing-aggressive 2D baselines, based on theOSU li-
braries [37]. All layouts are DRC clean. Area is in µm2, power
inmW , and delay in ns. See also Footnote 2.
Benchmark 45nm 180nm# Instances Area Power Delay # Instances Area Power Delay
b17_1 14,850 32,770.28 8.85 2.29 14,711 417,416 71.54 3.59
b20 6,959 15,549.31 8.12 2.87 7,521 216,168 97.94 3.6
b21 7,327 16,096.05 8.79 2.88 7,060 203,216 85.66 3.89
cannot readily infer the whole layout, even when they are
colluding. Once such strong protection is in place, it is eco-
nomically more reasonable to commission only one foundry.
4.1 Different Trusted and Untrusted Foundries
The commissioning of several foundries with different technologies
and trust levels has some critical implications as follows.
First, regarding the practical threat model, it is straightforward
to assign the new IP exclusively to the chip manufactured by the
trusted foundry. As for the resilience of this inherently secure 3D
SM scheme, there is no generic attack model in the literature yet
which can account for this scenario, that is, when given only one
part of the layout how to infer the missing connections and gates.
We believe that a corresponding “black-box” attack would be very
challenging, but we suggest that the community may consider it.
Second, due to the different pitches for different technologies,
only a fraction of the design can be delegated to the low-end chip.
That is at least as long as (a) the high-end chip shall have reasonable
utilization for cost efficiency and (b) the outlines of both chips shall
remain the same, which is a common requirement for 3D stacking.
Third, the overall power and performance is dominated by the
low-end chip, where other factors such as parasitics may further
exacerbate the overheads in practice [23].
In our exploratory experiments, we gauge the capabilities for
such 3D SM, assuming a trusted 180nm foundry and an untrusted
45nm foundry. More specifically, we leverage the OSU libraries [37].
Their libraries hold the same number, type, and strengths of cells;
this guarantees a fair comparison since CAD tools cannot leverage
different versions of cells. Synopsys DC was used for synthesis and
place and route was performed using Cadence Innovus 17.1. PPA
results for an aggressive timing closure of the 2D baseline setup
are given in Table 1.2 For the heterogeneous F2F 3D setup (Fig. 4),
we observe some performance degradation as we lift more gates to
the low-end tier. Also, note from Table 1 that area (and power) cost
is ≈12X (and 9X) when contrasting 180nm to 45nm. To maintain
a balanced utilization for both tiers, these correlations imply that
one should not lift more than ≈8% of the gates to the low-end tier.
While such small-scale lifting provides a reasonable performance
gain, especially from the perspective of commissioning only the
180nm foundry, it may not be enough to cover all the sensitive IP.
In short, we find that leveraging different foundries has practical
limitations. Delegating more than ≈8% of the gates to the low-end
foundry is ineffective, especially when considering that this foundry
has to implement LC as well, which incurs further cost.
2 The node 45nm is four generations away from 180nm, and delays improve by ≈30%
per generation [38]; surprisingly, delay degradations for the OSU 180nm library are
notably below such expectations. We believe that this is due the academic nature of
the library. At the point of writing, we had no access to different commercial libraries.
In any case, the key findings for our experiments remain valid. That is because once
the delay numbers in the library would be revised, and still assuming the same types
of cells are used, the overall delay would merely scale up linearly.
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Figure 4: Performance degradation when lifting gates in 3D
from the 45nm tier to the 180nm tier. The dotted lines indi-
cate the critical-path delays for the 180nm2D baseline setup.
See also Table 1 and Footnote 2.
4.2 Untrusted Foundries
Engaging with several untrusted foundries offering the same tech-
nology (or one untrusted foundry) also holds some key implications.
First, power and performance of such “conventional 3D ICs” can
be expected to excel those of the different-technology scenario
above. In fact, folding (or splitting) of 2D IP modules within 3D ICs
has been successfully demonstrated for some time [24, 30, 39, 40],
albeit without IP piracy in mind. Hence, savings from the folding
of IP modules may provide some margin for a defense scheme, but
we show in the remainder of this work that this margin naturally
depends on the design and the measures applied for protection.
Second, although IP modules can be folded/split across tiers,
which may mislead a reverse-engineering attacker, both tiers are
still manufactured by untrusted foundries. This fact implies that
LC schemes targeting on the device level cannot help to protect
the IP from adversaries in those foundries. Interestingly, there is
another LC flavor emerging, that is the obfuscation of intercon-
nects [11, 12, 41, 42]. Chen et al. [11] consider real and dummy vias
using magnesium, Mg and magnesium-oxide, MgO, respectively.
They demonstrate that real Mg vias oxidize quickly into MgO and,
hence, can become indistinguishable from the other MgO dummy
vias during reverse engineering. Hwang et al. [43] have shown that
Mg and MgO dissolve quickly when surrounded by fluids, which
is inevitable in etching procedures applied for reverse engineer-
ing. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume our interconnect
obfuscation to be based on the use of Mg/MgO vias.
We argue that the obfuscation of interconnects is a natural match
for F2F 3D ICs—in between the tiers, further redistribution layers
(RDLs) can be purposefully manufactured for obfuscation. Doing so
only requires a trustworthy BEOL facility, which is a practical as-
sumption given that BEOL fabrication is much less demanding than
FEOL fabrication, especially for higher metal layers (RDLs reside
between the F2F bonds which themselves are at higher layers).
5 METHODOLOGY
Here we elaborate on the CAD and manufacturing flow for our
notion of security-driven F2F stacking. The CAD flow is in parts in-
spired by Chang et al. [28], but we devise our flow with a particular
focus on IP protection (Fig. 5). Our flow allows a concerned designer
to explore the trade-offs between PPA and cuts, i.e., the number
of F2F inter-tier connections. Cuts are a crucial metric for the se-
curity analysis, which is discussed in more detail in Sec 6.3. It is
Design Partitioning Stage
Baseline 2D design
Extract timing information
Partition netlist into 
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Design Closure
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Figure 5: Our CAD flow for F2F 3D ICs, implemented in Ca-
dence Innovus. Security-driven steps are emphasized in bold.
also important to note that we follow the call for layout anonymiza-
tion [34]—we purposefully do not engage cross-tier optimization
steps, to mitigate layout-level hints on the obfuscated BEOL/RDLs.
As for the F2F process, we propose the following security-driven
modification. Thewafers for the two tiers are fabricated by one (two)
untrusted foundry (foundries) and then shipped to a trusted BEOL
and stacking facility. This trusted facility grows the obfuscated
RDLs on top of one wafer, and continues with the regular F2F flow
(i.e., flipping and bonding the second wafer on top).
5.1 Design Partitioning
After obtaining the post-routed 2D design, we partition the netlist
into top and bottom groups, representing the tiers of the F2F IC.
I/O ports are created for all interconnects between the two groups,
representing the F2F vias. Besides these F2F ports, we place primary
I/Os at the chip boundary, as in conventional 2D designs. (This is
also practical for F2F integrationwhere TSVs are to bemanufactured
at the chip boundary for primary I/Os and the P/G grid.)
Random partitioning: A naive way for security-driven parti-
tioning is to assign gates to the top/bottom groups randomly. When
doing so, the number of cuts will be dictated by the number, type,
and local interconnectivity of gates being assigned to one group.
Maximizing the cut-size: As already indicated (and further ex-
plored in Sec 6.3), the larger the cut size, the more difficult becomes
IP piracy. Hence, here we seek to increase the cut size as much as
reasonably possible. First, timing reports for the 2D baseline are
obtained. Next, gates are randomly alternated along their timing
paths towards the top/bottom groups. In the security-wise best case
(which is also the worst-case regarding power and performance), ev-
ery other gate is assigned to the top and bottom group, respectively;
for a path with n gates, 2n cuts are arising.
Timing-aware partitioning: Here we seek to reduce layout
cost while maintaining strong protection. First, the available timing
slack is determined for each gate. Then, based on a user-defined
threshold, the critical gates remain in the bottom tier, whereas all
other gates are moved to the top tier. This procedure is repeated
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Figure 6: (Left) RDL randomization for switchboxes and F2F
vias. (Right) Normalized distances between to-be-connected
F2F vias after randomization, for benchmark b17_1.
with revised timing thresholds until an even utilization for both tiers
is achieved. Note that it is not easy for an attacker to understand
whether any path in the bottom/top group is critical or not (or
complete, for that matter). In other words, the attacker has to tackle
both groups at once and, more importantly, resolve the randomized
F2F vias and the obfuscated interconnects (see below).
5.2 Planning of F2F Interconnects
After placing the bottom tier, the initial locations for F2F ports are
determined in the vicinity of the drivers/sinks. Then, a security-
driven, i.e., randomized placement of F2F ports is conducted, along
with customized on-track legalization. Next, obfuscated switchboxes
are placed, and the F2F ports are mapped to the top tier.
Randomization: It is easy to see that regular planning of F2F
interconnects cannot be secure, as this aligns the ports for the
bottom and top tier directly. Hence, we randomize the arrangement
of F2F ports as follows. (Fig. 6). We place additional F2F ports
randomly (yet with the help of the on-track legalization) in the top
RDL. These randomized ports are then routed through the RDLs
towards the original F2F ports connecting with the bottom tier,
which are also embedded into custom switchboxes (see next).
Obfuscated switchboxes: To protect against reverse engineer-
ing, we obfuscate the connectivity in the RDLs using a custom
switchbox (Fig. 7). This switchbox allows stealthy one-to-one map-
ping of four drivers to four sinks. The essence of the switchbox
are Mg/MgO vias [11], to cloak which driver connects to which
sink. The pins of the switchbox represent the F2F ports. To enable
proper utilization of routing resources, the pins are aligned with the
routing tracks. For randomization, the additional ports connecting
with the top tier are used for rerouting during design closure.
On-track legalization: Each F2F port is moved inside the core
boundary, towards the center point defined by all instances con-
nectedwith this port. Next, we obtain the closest and still-unoccupied
on-track locations for actual placement. If need be, we stepwise
increase the search radius considering a user-defined threshold.
5.3 Design Closure
After the F2F via planning stage, both tiers are placed and routed
separately. Here we do not engage in any cross-tier optimization,
to anonymize the individual tiers from each other, but we apply
intra-tier optimization. While routing the bottom tier, we also route
the randomized and obfuscated RDL with their switchboxes. Next,
we encapsulate the top and bottom partitions in a wrapper netlist,
and we assemble and implement the design followed by generating
a SPEF file that captures the RC parasitics of the F2F vias. Finally,
we perform DRC checks, evaluate the PPA, and stream out separate
DEF files for the top/bottom tiers and the RDL.
Bottom 
Tier 
RDL 
Top Tier 
Obfuscated switchbox in RDL 
Figure 7: Obfuscated switchbox, exemplarily for bottom-to-
top drivers. Each driver pin (downwards triangle) can con-
nect to any sink pin (upwards triangle). All F2F ports are
aligned with the pins of the switchbox here, for simplicity,
whereas the top-tier ports are randomized in reality.
6 RESULTS
6.1 Experimental Setup
Implementation and layout evaluation:Our CAD flow is based
on Cadence Innovus 17.1, using custom Tcl and Python scripts, which
impose negligible runtime overheads. We use the Nangate 45nm
library [44] for our experiments, with six metal layers for the base-
line 2D setup and six layers for the top and bottom tier each in
the F2F setup. The RDL comprises four duplicated layers of M6,
and F2F vias are modeled as M6 vias. (While this is an optimistic
assumption, for now, F2F scaling can be expected to reach such
dimensions.) The PPA analysis is conducted for the slow process
corner at 0.95V VDD. For power analysis, we assume a switching
activity of 0.2 for all primary inputs. We ensure that the layouts are
free of any congestion, by choosing appropriate utilization rates.
All experiments are carried out on an Intel Xeon E5-4660 @ 2.2 GHz
with CentOS 6.9. For Cadence Innovus, up to 16 cores are allocated.
Setup for security evaluation: Since we promote 3D SM, reg-
ular proximity attacks such as [18, 19] cannot be applied. Thus,
we propose (and publicly release [45]) a novel attack against 3D
SM, also accounting for the RDL obfuscation underlying in our
scheme; see also Sec. 6.3. The strength of our attack is evaluated
by commonly used metrics, i.e., the correct connection rate (CCR)
and Hamming distance (HD). HD is calculated using Synopsys VCS
with 1,000,000 test patterns. As for SAT-based reverse engineering
attacks, we leverage [46]. The related time-out is set to 72 hours.
Designs: Benchmarks from the ISCAS-85 and ITC-99 suites are
used for layout and security analysis.
6.2 Security-Driven Layout Evaluation
Our flow allows to trade off PPA and cuts; the latter dictates the
resilience against IP piracy both during and after manufacturing.
Figure 8 showcases the layout images for benchmark b22.
Maximizing the cut-size:Here wemove gates from the bottom
to the top group in steps of 10%, up to 50%. As the strategy is
randomized, we perform ten runs for each benchmark for any given
percentage of gates to move. The resulting power and performance
distributions are illustrated in Fig. 9. Interestingly, even for the
security-wise best case of randomly moving 50% of the gates, some
runs still provide better power and/or performance than the 2D
baseline. This finding demonstrates the potential for our scheme.
Note that we refrain both from randomizing the F2F ports and from
using the obfuscated switchboxes for these initial experiments.
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Figure 8: Layout snapshots of bottom/top tier (left/right) for
b22. The insets show the corresponding F2F vias.
Once F2F ports are randomized and switchboxes are used, larger
benchmarks such as b18_1 may incur overheads of up to 60%
(Fig. 10). Hence, although this strategy offers strong resilience,
a more aggressive PPA-security trade-off may be desired.
Timing-aware partitioning with F2F randomization and
obfuscated switchboxes: This setup tackles the need outlined
above. In fact, we observe that even for larger benchmarks (Fig. 11),
there can be some layout benefits when comparing these 3D designs
to their 2D baseline. To demonstrate the security implication of this
setup, we plot the normalized distances between to-be-connected
F2F vias in Fig. 6. This figure shows a wide variation across the
inter-tier nets, whereas for regular/unprotected F2F stacking the
distances would be all zero. For a more detailed security analysis,
see Sec 6.3. Next, we compare our work to prior art.
Comparisonwith LC schemes:Threshold-based LC is recently
gaining traction. Although promising in terms of resilience (for
some schemes even during manufacturing), the PPA overheads
are considerable. For example, Akkaya et al. [10] report overheads
of 9.2×, 6.6×, and 3.3× for PPA, respectively, when compared to
conventional 2-input NAND gate. Nirmala et al. [9] report 11.2×
and 10.5× cost for power and area, respectively. Collantes et al. [8]
report power and performance cost of 72% and 31%, respectively,
for 40% camouflaging. In [47], threshold voltages are leveraged to
obfuscate the interconnects, leading to PPA overheads of 29%, 44%,
and 33%, namely when 15% of the nets are obfuscated. In [12], PPA
overheads of 4.9%, 31.2%, and 25% are reported for b17 at 60% LC
(by obfuscation of the interconnects). Even when compared to the
latter more promising schemes, we can provide significantly better
PPA (except for [12] concerning power).
Dofe, Yan, et al. [48, 49] recently proposed LC for monolithic 3D
ICs. At the time of writing, their libraries were not available to us for
a detailed comparison. More importantly, however, manufacturing
of such camouflaged 3D ICs requires trust into an advanced fab. The
notion of 3D SM as in our scheme cannot be applied for monolithic
3D ICs (due to the sequential manufacturing process) and, thus,
their scheme [48, 49] cannot protect the IP at manufacturing time.
Comparison with SM schemes: In Table 2, we compare with
some studies on 2D SM. Overall, the placement-centric techniques
by Wang et al. [18] are competitive concerning power and perfor-
mance. However, as is always the case for regular SM, Wang et al.
can only avert fab-based adversaries, but not malicious end-users.
In Table 3, we compare with the security-driven 2.5D integration
scheme by Xie et al. [35]. Their work is relevant as they propose a
similar notion of security based on cut sizes. For the benchmarks
the authors considered, we obtain on average 53% more cuts in our
scheme. (For our cut sizes for larger benchmarks, refer to Table 4).
Regarding PPA, we observe significantly lower costs than [35].3
Besides, as with regular SM, their 2.5D scheme is not inherently
resilient against malicious end-users, but our 3D scheme is.
6.3 Security Analysis and Attacks
Proximity attack for 3D SM: To the best of our knowledge, there
is no attack yet in the literature which can account for 3D SM.
Hence, we propose and implement such an attack, with a focus on
one untrusted foundry (or two colluding foundries) and our RDL
obfuscation. We provide this attack as a public release in [45].
We assume that the attacker holds the layout files for the top
and bottom tier, but initially she has no access to the trusted RDL
(we discuss the implications for obtaining the RDL further below).
Although she understands how many drivers are connecting from
the bottom to the top tier and vice versa, she does not know which
driver connects to which sink, given the randomized F2F vias. Recall
that we do not engage in cross-tier optimization, to mitigate any
layout-level hints.4 Let us assume there are dbot drivers in the
bottom and dtop drivers in the top tier. Since we do not allow for
fan-outs within the RDL (as this would occupy more F2F vias than
necessary), there are only one-to-one mappings—this results in
dbot !×dtop ! possible netlists. Once switchboxes are used, however,
the attacker can tackle groups of four drivers/sinks at once. Still,
she has to resolve (a) which four top-tier drivers are connected to
which four bottom-tier sinks and vice versa, and (b) the connectivity
within the obfuscated switchboxes. For those cases, there are 4! ×((1/4 × dbot )! × (1/4 × dtop )!) possible netlists remaining. Next,
we outline the corresponding heuristics at the heart of our attack.
(1) Unique mappings: Any driver in the bottom/top tier will
feed only one sink in the top/bottom tier. Hence, an attacker
will reconnect drivers and sinks individually. Moreover, she
can identify all primary I/Os as they are implemented using
wirebonds or TSVs, not randomized F2F vias.
(2) Layout hints: Although the F2F vias are randomized, the at-
tacker may try to correlate the proximity and orientation of
F2F vias with their corresponding but withheld RDL connec-
tivity. Towards this end, she can also leverage the routing
towards the switchbox ports. Moreover, recalling the practi-
cal threat model, the attacker may be able to identify some
known IP and accordingly confine the related sets of candi-
date F2F interconnects. Our attack is generic and can account
for those scenarios, by keeping track of the candidate F2F
pairings considered by the attacker.
(3) Combinatorial loops: Since both tiers and thus all active com-
ponents are available to the attacker, she can readily exclude
those F2F connections inducing combinatorial loops.
We provide empirical attack results in Table 4. Here we assume
that the attacker was able to correctly infer all the driver-sink
3 Concerning area, note that we report on die outlines, which is standard practice for
3D studies. Accordingly, for our numbers of -50%, the F2F 3D IC and the 2D baseline
require the same total silicon area, i.e., we incur 0% absolute area cost. While Xie et al.
report similar cost, they omit that their scheme requires an interposer which—being at
least as large as the chips stacked onto it—incurs ≥100% cost. Still, mainly comprising
metal layers, we acknowledge that an interposer is less expensive than regular chips.
4Also recall the different-foundries scenario in Sec. 4.1, which is significantly more
challenging. There, the attacker has not only to tackle the driver-sink mappings but
furthermore guess the set of gates withhold by the trusted foundry.
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Figure 9: Impact of maximizing the cuts or F2F vias, by moving of gates, on performance (top) and power (bottom). Each
boxplot represents ten runs.
Table 2: PPA cost comparison with 2D SM protection schemes. Numbers are in % and quoted from the respective publications.
Benchmark BEOL+Physical [18] Logic+Physical [18] Logic+Logic [18] Concerted Lifting [16] Proposed with Random PartitioningArea Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area∗ Power Delay
c432 N/A 0.17 0.49 N/A 0.44 0.24 N/A 0.17 0.21 7.7 13.1 11.6 -50 -2.66 0.31
c880 N/A 0.25 0.05 N/A 0.35 0.03 N/A -0.05 -0.09 0 12.1 19.9 -50 0.97 1.6
c1355 N/A 0.52 0.57 N/A 0.75 0.42 N/A 0.03 0.01 0 12.2 21.3 -50 1.83 0.38
c1908 N/A 1.1 1.3 N/A 1.1 0.23 N/A 0.45 0.39 7.7 14.6 18.9 -50 0.11 1.69
c2670 N/A 0.29 0.27 N/A 0.29 0.27 N/A 0.05 0.03 7.7 10 12 -50 -2.18 3.32
c3540 N/A 0.53 0.28 N/A 0.36 0.02 N/A 0.14 -0.02 7.7 5 2.8 -50 0.59 4.32
c5315 N/A 0.19 -0.01 N/A 0.67 0.08 N/A 0.29 -0.01 7.7 7.9 16.9 -50 -1.66 4.73
c6288 N/A 0.29 0.19 N/A 0 0 N/A 0.1 0.67 27.3 12.3 15.7 -50 10.43 10.21
c7552 N/A 0.28 -0.36 N/A 0.35 -0.05 N/A 0.56 1.77 16.7 9.3 15.7 -50 10.57 8.21
Average N/A 0.4 0.31 N/A 0.48 0.14 N/A 0.19 0.33 9.2 10.7 15 -50 2 3.86
∗Following the standard practice for 3D studies, we report on area by considering individual die outlines. In [16], area is reported in terms of die outlines as well.
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Figure 10: Layout cost for maximizing cuts, 35–50% gates
moved, obfuscated switchboxes and F2F randomization.
Each boxplot represents ten runs.
pairings through the switchboxes, only the obfuscation within
switchboxes themselves remains to be attacked. This is a strong
assumption and rendering our evaluation conservative. In fact, this
scenario can be considered as an optimal proximity attack, as for
all F2F connections the correct one is always among the consid-
ered candidates. The results in Table 4 indicate the computational
efficiency of our attack for smaller designs, but also the challenges
once larger designs with large solution spaces are to be tackled.
With regards to CCR and HD for the successfully recovered netlists,
our protection scheme can be considered as reasonably secure.
SAT-based attack: After manufacturing, the attacker can read-
ily understand which four drivers/sinks are connected through the
switchboxes, but she still has to resolve the obfuscation within the
switchboxes themselves. The attacker may now leverage a working
Table 3: Comparison with [35]. PPA is in contrast to a 2D
baseline, numbers are in %. See also Footnote 3 on area.
Benchmark Xie et al. [35] (SC+SP) Proposed with Random PartitioningCut Size Area Power Delay Cut Size Area Power Delay
c432 130 1 17.6 5.9 134 -50 (0) -2.66 0.31
c880 141 0 29.4 10 138 -50 (0) 0.97 1.6
c1355 130 0 17.6 17.6 91 -50 (0) 1.83 0.38
c1908 132 1 11.8 29.4 149 -50 (0) 0.11 1.69
c2670 152 0 11.8 5.9 154 -50 (0) -2.18 3.32
c3540 133 0 5.9 5.9 349 -50 (0) 0.59 4.32
c7552 157 1 1 5.9 477 -50 (0) 10.57 8.21
Average 139 0.4 13.6 11.5 213 -50 (0) 1.32 2.83
Table 4: Attack results on average. Time-out ‘t-o’ is 72 hours.
Benchmark Cut Sizes SAT Attack [46] Proposed 3D-SM Proximity AttackRandom Timing-Aware Runtime (Min.) CCR (%) HD (%) Runtime (Sec.)
c432 134 56 624 30.4 45.2 10
c880 138 53 642 27.8 39.4 23
c1355 91 37 492 31.1 43.8 53
c3540 349 97 948 22.6 41.3 3,729 (62 Minutes)
b17_1 6,650 2,482 t-o N/A N/A t-o
b18 15,974 6,906 t-o N/A N/A t-o
b18_1 16,706 6,616 t-o N/A N/A t-o
b19 33,417 13,142 t-o N/A N/A t-o
copy as an oracle and launch a SAT attack. Towards that end, we
employ the attack proposed in [46], and we model the problem us-
ing multiplexers as outlined in [50, 51]. Empirical results are given
in Table 4. As expected, the SAT attack succeeds for smaller designs
but runs into time-out for larger designs. This finding is also consis-
tent with those reported by Xie et al. [35] for their security-driven
2.5D scheme, which has a security notion similar to our work.
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Figure 11: Performance, power cost for timing-aware 3D
setup with obfuscated switchboxes and F2F randomization.
Each boxplot represents ten runs.
7 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Initially, we review prior art and their limitations. We also put
forward a novel, practical threat model of IP piracy which is in line
with the business models of present-day chip companies. Next, we
elaborate in detail how 3D integration is a naturally strong match
to combine SM and LC. (This also allows us to extend the defense
scope of SM to practical commercial applications.) Towards this
end, we propose a security-driven CAD and manufacturing flow for
face-to-face (F2F) ICs, an up-and-coming option for 3D integration.
We conduct comprehensive experiments on DRC-clean layouts,
and strengthened by an extensive security analysis, we argue that
entering the third dimension is promising for IP protection.
As for future work, we aim for a more formal method for parti-
tioning gates across tiers, also to protect against other threats such
as hardware Trojans. In the broader sense, we plan to explore if and
how 3D integration can provide resilience against physical attacks
such as invasive probing or exploitation of side-channel leakage.
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